广发之槌未落 思量宜多
刘川2006-9-18日
广发行之槌未落，是一见好事，可容人多思量：广东是要最好的伙伴，还是要最强的伙伴。最强的伙伴，不一定是最好的伙伴，更不一定是最合适自己的伙伴。最强的伙伴，如果与自己不是一条心的，可能就是一个最早消灭异已，也包括消灭自己的对手，以至于是敌手，视不两立。
现在，向广发行求婚的，有三个组团，一是美国花旗银行为首的团队，一是法国兴业银行为首的团队，一是中国平安保险为首的团队。表面上看，每一个团队，各有奇术，成员伙伴也是五颜六色。前两个团队，是外资打头，为了中看又中用，拉来了中国人寿、中国粮油、中国石化等国队充数，以增加夺标筹码。后一团队，是国内保险界的野战军，为壮大实力，早就发展成以中国人为核心的多国部队，有外国的管理团队沉入其中。三组团队，看上去最弱的是平安。但我们想一想，谁是最好的伙伴。这就需要我们知已知彼。
先说知已。第一，从业务需要亚看，广发行是一个省级的地区性银行，服务对象主要是广东省城乡地区，为此，其营业网点的分布，就不能只考虑人口稠密，金融资源丰富的城市，也要照顾到人口与储蓄少，但老百姓需求大的乡镇。第二，从城乡差距看，广东省南富北穷，东阔西贫，不仅GDP与财税收入主要来源于珠三角的广州、深圳、珠海三大城，还有东莞、中山、佛山三大市，以及南海、番禹、顺德三小市，而且金融资源，主要包括储蓄、信贷和金融、证券交易等，也多集中在这一带。广发行的金融功能之一，就是要集有余而补不足，用富裕地区的钱，去帮补贫困地区的经济发展。第三，广东省经济的城乡二元化，不亚于文化的城乡二元化，这两种二元化，导致了观念的二元化，乡镇地区百姓大多在温饱阶段，投资理念还在等待漫长的播种期。
再说知彼。外资银行在华经营的目标是利润第一。为此，它们主要看重的是广东省最富裕的地区，但绝对不包括贫困的乡镇。为此，它们的服务网点的分布，重点是城市，而且是富裕的城市，不会是乡镇。不仅如此，它们还会收缩现有乡镇地区的广发行网点，而乡镇又是最需要金融扶持的地方。因此，外资银行普遍倾向是发展城市业务，收缩（甚至完全放弃中国的乡镇网点），以最大限度地收割中国的经济发展与金融发展的成果。它们不希望播种，但乐于收获；它们不希望为贫困支付成本，但急于从富裕中得到利润，而且是利润的最大化。这就是外资银行的目标与特点。
以花旗银行为例，它有三大特点。第一，它在美国，主要是发展城市金融，而美国本土的农村人口不过只有3%，它的发展方向，与美国国情是相配合的；但在世界各地，特别是在以农业人口为主的亚洲和拉美，花旗银行在那些地方的乡镇，杳无踪影，而是集中在大城市布点经营。在香港，花旗干脆自译为“城市银行”（City Bank），不叫“花旗”。在世界各地，花旗银行以利润第一，是叫得最响的，它很少为发展中国家与政府，考虑什么经济平衡发展的问题，帮助当地政府合理利用金融资源，循环扶贫。相反，它从富裕地区攫取了利润，只会使贫困地区的金融资源更贫困。它在印尼、墨西哥、哥伦比亚、阿根廷、巴西的历史，完全是进入与聚集大、中城市，收缩与关闭偏远或落后地区银行网点的历史，而且利用金融集聚的资源，压制本地金融，与国家组级银行下面叫板，是引发当地金融危机的种子银行。二，花旗银行的金融创新够狠够猛，在世界银行同业中，有一个相当负面的评价——“街头坏孩子”，以至成为美国银行监管委员会的头号乌蝇，也是欧洲与日本金融监管者的眼中钉，肉中刺。2003年美国联邦法院判罚花旗银行向信用卡消费者支付5.5亿美元赔偿金，理由是它在消费者不知情的情况下，向他们的信用卡扣取透支利息。2004年，英国金融服务管理局（简称FSA：The Financial Services Agency）就花旗银行在同年8月2日操纵欧洲债券交易，构成 “异常交易行为”，第一次展开欧债的正式调查。当天，花旗集团在不到两分钟的时间内，在欧洲债券市场上出售了以欧元标价的欧洲政府债券，价值约为110亿欧元(约合15亿美元)，令该类债券价格狂跌。此后不久，花旗集团又趁低价买回40亿欧元。2005年，日本FSA对花旗银行在日本的分行帮助黑社会洗钱，予其日本历史上最严厉的惩罚——关闭它的私人理财部门与全部相关业务。2005年，欧盟证券暨金融交易委员会对花旗银行予以重罚及公开谴责，理由是它在证券市场上，利用股票与其它衍生工具进行交叉运作，违反了正常的交易守则，该项罚款为5亿欧元，以及退出全部交易所得。尽管它的金融创新，常常打破监管漏洞，有帮助政府改进监管之利，但这不是它的慈善目的，只是一种客观的结果。第三，自1980年代中期以来，花旗银行的主要利润来源是信用卡利息，2003-2004年度，竟然达至全部利润的60%。根据国际经验，当一个地区年人均GDP超过1000美元，就进入信用卡发卡、用卡与循环利率支付的发展期。广东省已经在2002年就达到这一标准，尤其是三大城、三大市、三小市的人均年收入，早就过了1万人民币，是花旗信用卡的大金矿！这正是老布什急于给中国政府发出“公关信”，助其竞投广发行的根本原因。想想看，花旗银行入股上海浦东发展银行后，死死抓住信用卡的业务不放，搞得合作方很不痛快，正是广发行的前车之鉴。
花旗银行为推广应用信用卡，首先就致力于改变所在地的传统文化，从而为美国式的信用文化——即透支消费文化，或曰过度消费的文化。其次，强调个人理财文化，突出个人消费与大额财富管理，这种管理导致了它在经营理财务中的第三个突出的作法，就是利用衍生工具，在证券与金融市场上翻云覆雨。消费文化——个人理财——衍生交易，这三大业务，已经不是传统的银行业务，即不再是传统的信贷业务，这种突出个人、突出富人、突出风险的经营方式，绝对不符合发展中国国家的利益，也不符合广东省这样一个需要平衡发展的人口大省（中国人口第三大省，共有9300万）政府与百姓的利益。而这种透支消费文化，在国内尚无个人信用来台与全国性征信机制的基础上，如果在省内发展，将是全省性金融危机的最大隐患。难道广东省政府愿意引入这样一种文化，来与自己的政治与经济发展目标背道而驰吗？难道广东省政府愿意把自己打造成一个中国金融领域中高风险的省份吗？难道广东省政府愿意把广发行变成一个高风险而又不听管束的“坏孩子”吗？如果广东省政府不慎将它引入，以其理念改造广发行，若干年后才发现引狼入室了，则为时晚矣。因为，如果让花旗银行进了家门，再想赶出去，谈何容易，介时就不是简单的引入外资的问题，而必然是中美外交的大事了，美国政府的外交干涉势在必然。花旗银行从来不是省油的灯，无论是在日本、欧盟犯了事，何时不见美国政府出面说项，在发展中国国家，更是如此，在香港金融危机中，花旗不仅背地里给金融大鄂释放大量短期贷款，而且还鼓动美国驻港领事馆出面，攻击香港政府的入市自卫行动。难道广东省政府愿意以此成为全国关注的焦点吗？换言之，广东省政府愿意成为一个不良的银行引资的坏典型吗？可以预言，广东省若引花旗银行入主广发行，将付出难以评估的政治与经济代价。
彼已对照，我们的目标，与花旗银行的业务目标与特点一致吗？当然不一致，连大至一致也谈不上。从这一巨大差异上看，若冀望它未来与本省的长远计划达成默契，更不可能。早知明日，何必今天？晚一点落槌，不但是好事，也是幸事，免得请神容易送神难。
此外，有一点不能不提。花旗银行在十九末至二十世纪中叶，在中国掠夺白银与金融资源的历史，也是有案可查的。对任何外资都一样，有历史劣迹的，不清算，必重犯。中国任何一级政府，如果忘记这一点，就是对人民的不负责任，也是对历史的背叛。
政府要把住的关口是：为中国选最好的外资，而不是最强的外资；为广发行选最好的伙伴，而不是最强的伙伴。只要对广发行最好，又何必请最强的进来，助纣为虐，令其变为强盗呢？
重要资料：（因其它资料均有中文，故只引一则国内无的一则）
来自《纽约时报》：
Japan Shuts Unit of Citibank, Citing Violations
September 18, 2004
By TODD ZAUN
TOKYO, Sept. 17 - In one of the severest penalties ever
imposed on a bank in Japan, regulators on Friday ordered
Citigroup to close its Japanese private banking operations
because of serious violations of the country's banking
laws.
The Financial Services Agency ordered Citibank to shut the
four branches in Japan where it offers private banking
services to wealthy customers after the agency discovered a
string of violations and improprieties over the last three
years. The actions cited included failing to put in effect
measures to prevent money laundering, overcharging
customers for financial derivative products and making
loans that helped clients carry out a variety of improper
deals, regulators said.
"A number of acts injurious to public interests, serious
violations of laws and regulations, and extremely
inappropriate transactions were uncovered at the Private
Bank Group, which led us to conclude that continued future
operations are inappropriate," the Financial Services
Agency wrote in its order.
Citibank in Japan apologized for the violations and vowed
to improve its management and its internal controls.
"Citibank Japan sincerely apologizes for the problems
identified in the F.S.A. orders and is earnestly addressing
the issues raised and working to prevent their recurrence,"
the bank said in a statement. It added that it "is
committed to doing everything necessary to restore the
confidence of its customers."
The bank was ordered to come up with a plan to improve its
business operations by Oct. 22. Citibank will have a year
to close its private banking business. Though it cannot
accept new customers after Sept. 29, the bank can continue
to serve its current clients until Sept. 30, 2005. On that
date, regulators will revoke Citibank's license to operate
the four branches and they must be closed. Citibank could
reapply for those licenses, but that would probably take
years.
The bank said it did not know yet what would happen to the
400 employees working in the Japanese private banking
division.
Citibank also has 25 retail branches in Japan, but those
branches are not affected by Friday's order.
It was the second time this week that Citigroup has
expressed contrition for breaches in its overseas
operations.
On Tuesday, the company apologized for a huge bond trade in
Europe that outraged competitors and led to an
investigation by regulators in Britain; France and Germany
are also looking into the trade. In early August, Citigroup
traders sold 11 billion euros of European government debt
($13 billion) within minutes via an electronic trading
system only to buy some of it back less than an hour later
at lower prices.
The transactions were not illegal, but rivals said
Citigroup violated an unwritten rule among big bond houses
not to use their trading heft to manipulate prices.
Citibank's private banking business in Japan concentrates
on customers with about $1 million to save or invest and
emphasizes highly personalized service. But regulators said
Citibank's private banking division often misled its
well-heeled clients. Regulators said Citibank charged some
customers above-market prices for publicly traded
derivatives and failed to explain fully the risks involved
in many of its financial products.
Regulators say Citibank also went beyond the scope of its
banking license by brokering real estate and art deals for
its rich clients - activities not allowed under Japanese
banking laws.
Private banking employees were also reckless with client
information, the bank regulators said. For example, some
employees kept records of secret passwords for the most
forgetful clients. Regulators discovered no cases of
employees using the passwords to steal money.
Toshihide Endo, director of the Financial Services Agency's
supervisory bureau, said that employees of the private
banking group might have been tempted to take shortcuts
when screening clients because "their salaries and
performance evaluations were closely linked to sales
targets.''
"That might be one of the main reasons this kind of
misconduct happened at Citibank," he said.
In one case, the private banking unit in Japan accepted a
customer who had been flagged repeatedly as suspicious by
another unit of Citibank, the agency said in its statement.
In another, the private banking group made a loan to a
group of clients who used the money in a stock manipulation
scheme. One of those same clients received a short-term
loan from Citibank to inflate his account balance
temporarily in a scheme to secure a government grant, Mr.
Endo said.
Citibank said on Friday that six executives in Japan had
left the company because of the problems made public Friday
and that it had reprimanded other employees.
In July, Citigroup appointed its chief auditor, Douglas
Peterson, to succeed Charles Whitehead as chief executive
of the Japan operations.
A Citibank Japan spokesman, Toru Ichikawa, would not
comment on whether Mr. Whitehead's departure was related to
the troubles at the private banking division.
Citigroup does not provide figures on how much the private
banking business in Japan contributes to its overall
revenue or profit, but overseas private banking contributed
only about 3 percent of Citigroup's net income in 2003.
Citibank's retail banking unit was also ordered to stop
taking new foreign-currency deposits for one month,
beginning Sept. 29, and to improve management controls.
This suspension came for failing to detect a case in which
a Citibank employee embezzled 1.8 billion yen (currently
$16.4 million) from depositors over seven years, beginning
in 1997.
The only other bank to face shutdown orders from Japanese
regulators was Credit Suisse Financial Products, which had
its banking license revoked in 1999 for blocking an
investigation into whether it was engineering financial
products specifically to help companies conceal losses on
their accounting statements. The company was a unit of the
Credit Suisse Group.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/18/business/worldbusiness/18citi.html?ex=1096499638&ei=1&en=070124c55e8b9bad
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