6月29日，在电视上看了重庆的中华红歌会。不错。6月30日，在电视上看了中央电视台的庆祝晚会。也还不错。7月1日，在网上看了看，发现纽约时报网站上已有些“祝贺”中国共产党建党90周年的文章，其中有好几篇在庆祝未来的诺贝尔和平奖获得者艾未未及胡佳已在七一前获释。另两篇6月30日的“祝贺”文章也不错，于是复制下来，星期天花了点时间译出来，并写了点简单的评论。
第一篇的题目是《伟大的党，但共产主义在哪里？》。只看题目及开头，还以为是一位海外左派写的呢，他责骂共产党，是希望共产党来搞真正的共产主义。但随后就看到，看起来更像是个89余孽，如同茅于轼贺卫方们一样，他们用的方法都差不多，先疯狂地攻击毛泽东时代，然后大力表扬中国经济改革，最后尖锐批评当今的中国共产党，这样就把屎盆子牢牢地扣到共产党头上了，共产党也就完成它的历史“屎”命。文章中所说的经济革命造就的强大社会力量及所谓中产阶级，也就可以通过所谓民主、自由、法治等类口号和程序合法地上台执政，保住并继续扩大经济改革的胜利果实了。文中最后提醒中共，一党执政的纪录为74年，中共恐怕破不了这个纪录了。这种说法有点类似前久的希拉里讲话，想阻挡住民主的潮流，想赖在台上不走，stay in power，能拖就拖，是傻瓜在胡折腾。这篇“祝贺”文章更像是悼词，或诅咒，90岁了，执政62年了，快去死吧。
第二篇的题目是《中共在90》。文章的前半部分嫌党史第二卷写得还不够好，虽然彻底否定了文革，但还是没有把党的错误写足写透写够，如没写大跃进时饿死了4500万人，没写邓小平在反右中的出色表现，没彻底否定毛泽东而是找了些顶罪的。文章还提到赵紫阳没有如华国锋那样死后被“平反”。反毛者最后必反邓拥赵，看来中外的反毛者为完成资本主义复兴大业已统一了认识。文章的后半部分开始表扬邓小平去世之后1997-2009年间中国搞的一些政治体制改革，认为中共如继续改革下去就能避免如原苏共一样崩溃。停滞、僵化和倒退没有出路。这很滑稽，原苏共不正是按他们的指示使劲折腾最后将自己折腾死了么？推举出改革派的领导。国外的一些文章总喜欢造谣说中共内部有对立的派别或权力斗争，显然，这些人在时刻梦想中国也会出现利比亚那样的反对派，或者出一两个当年苏联那样的戈尔巴或叶利钦，那样肢解瓜分起中国来就更方便了。中国共产党也就找到新的出路了。文章的最后同样没有忘记写上几句祝贺中国共产党90岁生日的话，90多岁了，该死了，垂死挣扎是没用的。
这群王八蛋。这样来祝贺我们的党，伟大的中国共产党，90岁的生日。
2011/7/4
附一：
伟大的党，但共产主义在哪里？
Minxin Pei，2011/6/30，纽约时报网站
无疑，从90年前代表50余个党员的12个一大代表建立了中国共产党起，中国共产党已经走过了一段长路。
然而，无论当时它看起来是多么地弱小，它的意识形态、身份与使命是毫无疑问的。在马克思主义乌托邦的启示下，党代表了中国的理想主义左派、民族主义者和被压迫者。它的任务是结束社会的不公和西方的殖民主义。
今天，党是一头政治巨兽，它有8000万党员，控制着世界第二大经济体。在国内，它对权力的掌握没有有组织的挑战，在国外，它的领导者被给予了毛和周恩来从来不曾梦想过的尊敬。
确实，我们该给予这个党它所应得的东西，因为它抛弃了前三十年执政的毛主义的疯狂——大规模的恐怖、饥饿、残酷的政治运动和邪恶的权力斗争——根本上地改善了中国13亿人的物质生活。
然而，如果我问，“共产党代表什么？”几乎没有一个今天的中国领导人会给出一个一致的或诚实的回答。
这我们知道：它不再代表一种乌托邦的意识形态。如果真有一种意识形态是党所代表的，这种意识形态是权力意识形态。党统治的唯一理由，是党一直掌握权力是绝对必要的。
党也不代表中国的群众。尽管它做了很多努力去扩展它的社会基础，去更多地联系中国有活力的、多样化的社会，今天的这个党却已发展成为一台自我服务的、官僚主义化的政治庇护机器。它无可否认地成了一个精英党，它百分之七十以上的党员来自政府官员，军队，大学毕业生，商人和教授。
因此，从它所有外在表现来看，这个党实际上面临着一个存在危机和一个不确定的未来。除了继续呆在台上，它没有公共意义。这个危机不仅是意识形态上的，还是政治上的。这大体上解释了这个党和它的精英们的犬儒主义、腐败和不安全感。
由于这个党已坚定地拒绝民主化，因此它的唯一生存策略就是继续维持自1989年6月天安门镇压后开始的这一进程：从经济增长中获取政治合法性，但依赖镇压去粉碎对它的权力垄断的挑战。虽然这一策略自天安门事件以来一直运行得很好，但它的有效性和可持续性越来越受到怀疑。
在经济层面上，增长将慢下来。人口老龄化、资源约束、经济改革停止及环境恶化几乎肯定会压低中国的增长潜力。世界银行一份乐观的预报中预测2016-2020中国的年经济增长率约为7%——一个可观的数字，但与目前年增长率相比，跌了30%。
中国的经济革命也释放出了强大的社会力量，这种力量将使维持一党之国更加困难。这个党的统治哲学和组织结构使它难于与中国日益增长的中产阶级在政治上结合起来。经济减速和日渐增多的政治激进主义的汇聚，将从几个方向挑战这个党的统治。
现在中国共产党已经执政62年了，它的领导者们或许也想注意，一党执政的纪录是74年，由原苏共保持，第二名是墨西哥的IRP，71年。
因此，当中国的领导人们举杯庆祝党的90岁生日时，他们应该不会怀有幻想，这个党能永远战胜历史的几率。
Minxin Pei is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in California.
附二：
中共在90
：DAVID SHAMBAUGH，2011/6/30，纽约时报网站
北京——为了纪念党的90岁生日，执政的中国共产党发起了全国范围内的纪念仪式与洪水般的媒体复盖宣传，但所有的这些喧闹都隐藏不住这个党的不安情形。
中国中央电视台（CCTV）已在连续播放关于党史的长篇叙述性记录片，书店里充满了红色封面的历史书籍，博物馆里举行了各种特殊的展览——包括新国家博物馆的“复兴之路”。最后，党的总书记胡锦涛，还将发表一个全国讲话。
这些庆祝活动的主题是共产党洗刷了中国的“百年耻辱”，给中国带来了繁荣与尊严。对过去所受侵略、侵害的叙述是普遍深入的，同样普遍的断言是，共产党重建了社会并恢复了中国在世界上的合理地位。
与这些欢庆活动相伴的是一场空前的官方对党史的回顾。在16年的准备之后，中央党史研究办公室写出了一本1000多页的从1949-1978年的党史（1978年后的历史显然仍太政治敏感，因其中的很多官员仍在当权）。
这一卷虽然提供了很多毛时代时的敏感事件的新材料，但它仍是高度选择性的并在很大程度上与1982年公报中的主要叙述保持一致：“我党历史中的某些问题”。
书中一点都没提到1950年代政治运动的暴行，这些暴行导致了数千万人的死亡（一些运动被谈到了，但没提到被迫害的及被杀害的）。1956年的“百花齐放运动”完全没有被提到，在这场运动中，知识分子对党的领导发起了全面批评（其中许多批评如今还适用）。只有随后的反右运动被写进去了（以一种无害化处理后的方式）——但没提邓小平在指挥这场运动中的角色。
大跃进，制造出了“三年困难时期（1960-1962）”，根据历史学家弗兰克迪科特对新档案材料的研究，造成了4500万人的死亡。大跃进和文化大革命（1966-76）得到实质性的处理，但这两大灾难基本上被归结为由林彪、江青及四人帮等极左分子的篡党夺权造成。
毛自己确实受到批评，但全部的谴责都被转移到别人身上去了。毛的继承者华国锋死后被“平反”，但赵紫阳没有那样的好运。
官方对这些事件的处理是清楚的：维持一个强大的制度组织，保持警惕，反对党内的篡权与外国的破坏。因此，即使在一个周年庆祝中，这个党仍然无法诚实地、全面地面对它的过去，这充分说明了它的现在与将来。这是它对当前不安的症状表现。
自2009年秋以来，随着17届四中全会的召开，中国和世界看到了一个更压抑和不安的共产党，一些1997-2009年间进行的政治改革，现在慢下来了。
尽管政治停滞，但三套改革仍在继续：扩大地方党委的有多位候选人的选举，增加地方预算和资源分配的透明度，在党政的各种层面上努力改进贤能领导。但在如何使主要政策制定更加透明、惩治普遍的腐败、改进党内民主和党外监督及开放媒体方面，全都停下来了。
这些改革都来自于党对苏联及其它一些一党政权的崩溃进行的研究。中国共产党从这些外国例子中得出的主要经验是要主动、灵活、适应，从上述方面去进行政治改变。停止和教条被看作是停滞与崩溃的原因。
然而，当这个党过了90岁时，我们所看到的却与这相反。它不是无忧的和自信的，而是看上去被未来吓得呆住了，不能确信自己对少数民族地区的控制（西藏、新疆和内蒙），害怕正在增加的社会不满和一些特别的游行，担心宏观经济与外交关系，以及最终，2012年主要权力的交接。
此外，一个内部安全力量、巨型国企、宣传机构及军队的联盟已与党内的强硬路线因素结合起来，一起把改革往后拉。
然而在党内有一个由温家宝总理领导的改革派，它提倡政治更加开放。然而它没有资源或联盟去重启政治改革。党内的裂缝正变得又高又深，表明观点和派系的党员们正日益两极分化。即将到来的权力交接仅增加了被厌恶与打击的风险。
90岁的中国共产党有点象很多90多岁的老人：越来越衰弱，胆小害怕，设法延长寿命，但因这太复杂而终归失败。
David Shambaugh 是一个华盛顿大学的教授和“中国政策纲要” 的主持者及《中国共产党：萎缩与适应》一书的。
Great Party, but Where's the Communism?
By MINXIN PEI
Published: June 30, 2011
There is little question that the Chinese Communist Party has come a long way since it was founded 90 years ago by 12 delegates representing roughly 50 members.
Yet however insignificant it may have seemed back then, there was no question about its ideology, identity and mission. Inspired by utopian Marxism, the party represented China’s idealist leftists, nationalists and the downtrodden. Its mission was to end social injustice and Western colonialism.
Today the party is a political behemoth, with 80 million members and control of the world’s second-largest economy. At home its grip on power faces no organized challenge; abroad its leaders are accorded a respect Mao and Zhou Enlai could not have dreamed of.
Indeed, we should give the party its due for having abandoned the Maoist madness of its first three decades in power — the mass terror, famine, brutal political campaigns and vicious power struggles — and for radically improving the material lives of China’s 1.3 billion people.
Yet if asked, “What does the Communist Party stand for,” few Chinese leaders today could give a coherent or honest answer.
This much we know: It no longer stands for a utopian ideology. If there is one ideology that the party represents, it is the ideology of power. The sole justification for the party’s rule is the imperative to stay in power.
Nor does the party stand for China’s masses. Despite efforts to broaden its social base and make it more connected with China’s dynamic and diverse society, the party today has evolved into a self-serving, bureaucratized political patronage machine. It is undeniably an elitist party, with more than 70 percent of its members recruited from government officials, the military, college graduates, businessmen and professionals.
So for all its apparent power, the party is in fact facing an existential crisis and an uncertain future. Apart from staying in power, it has no public purpose. The crisis is not only ideological, but also political; it explains much of the cynicism, corruption and insecurity of the party and its elites.
As the party has firmly rejected democratization, its only strategy for survival is to maintain the course it has embarked on since the Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989: drawing political legitimacy from economic growth but relying on repression to crush challenges to its monopoly of power. Although this strategy has worked well since Tiananmen, its effectiveness and sustainability are increasingly in doubt.
On the economic front, growth is about to slow down. Demographic aging, resource constraints, stalled economic reforms and environmental degradation are almost certain to depress China’s growth potential. An optimistic World Bank forecast predicts a growth rate from 2016-2020 of about 7 percent annually — a respectable number, but a 30 percent drop from today’s rate.
China’s economic revolution is also unleashing powerful social forces that will make maintaining a one-party state more tenuous. The party’s governing philosophy and organizational structure make it difficult to incorporate China’s growing middle-class politically. The convergence of an economic slowdown and rising political activism will challenge the party’s rule from several directions.
Now that the Chinese Communist Party has been in power for 62 years, its leaders might also want to note that the record for one-party rule is 74 years, held by the Soviet party, followed by the 71-year rein of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party.
So when Chinese leaders toast their party’s 90th birthday, they should harbor no illusions that the party can beat history’s odds forever.
Minxin Pei is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in California.
China's Communist Party at 90
By DAVID SHAMBAUGH
Published: June 30, 2011
BEIJING — Nationwide ceremonies and a deluge of media coverage have been mobilized by China’s ruling Communist Party to mark its 90th anniversary today. But all the hoopla cannot conceal the party’s insecure state.
Central China Television (CCTV) has been airing long narrative documentaries about the party’s history; bookstores are full of red-covered histories; museums have mounted special exhibitions — including the new National Museum’s “Road to Rejuvenation.” And the buildup will be capped by a nationwide address by the party’s general secretary, President Hu Jintao.
The main theme in all these celebrations has been that the party has provided China prosperity and dignity following a “century of shame and humiliation.” The narrative of past aggression and aggrievement is pervasive, as is the affirmation that the party has rebuilt Chinese society and restored China’s rightful place in the world.
Accompanying the festivities is an unprecedented official look into the party’s past. After 16 years of preparation, the Central Party History Research Office has produced a 1,000-plus-page compendium of the party’s history from 1949 to 1978 (post-1978 apparently remains too politically sensitive because many of the officials involved are still in power).
While the tome provides many new details of sensitive events during the Mao era, it is still highly selective and largely in step with the master narrative laid down in the 1982 publication: “Certain Questions in Our Party’s History.”
Nowhere mentioned is the violence of political campaigns during the 1950s that cost the lives of tens of millions (some of the campaigns are discussed, but not the persecutions and killings). The 1956 Hundred Flowers Movement, in which intellectuals launched broadside critiques of party rule (many which remain apt today), is totally absent. Only the subsequent “Anti-Rightist” purge is covered (in a sanitized fashion) — but not Deng Xiaoping’s role in directing it.
The Great Leap Forward, which produced the “three bitter years” (1960-62) and claimed the lives of up to 45 million, according to new archival research by the historian Frank Dikotter, and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) receive substantial treatment. But both catastrophes are essentially attributed to the usurping of party rule by “leftist opportunists” like Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four.
Mao himself does come in for criticism, but overall the blame is shifted to others. Mao’s successor Hua Guofeng does benefit from a posthumous “rehabilitation,” but no such luck for the disgraced Zhao Ziyang.
The official treatment of these events is clear: maintain a strong institutional apparatus and remain vigilant against inner-party usurpers and foreign saboteurs. Thus, even in the midst of an anniversary celebration, the party’s continuing inability to honestly and fully confront its past speaks volumes about its present and future. It is symptomatic of existing insecurities.
Since the autumn of 2009, following the Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee, China and the world have witnessed a more repressive and insecure Communist Party, including a slowing of some political reforms undertaken from 1997-2009.
Despite the political stagnation, three sets of reforms have continued: expanding multi-candidate elections to local level party committees; increased transparency in local budgeting and resource allocation; and efforts to improve meritocracy at all levels of the party and government. But efforts to make central policy making more transparent, to prosecute pervasive corruption, to improve “intra-party democracy” and “extra-party supervision,” and to open up the media have all stagnated.
These reforms all grew out of the party’s study of the collapse of the Soviet Union and other one-party regimes. The main lesson the Chinese Communist Party drew from these foreign examples was to be proactive, flexible and adaptive, and to manage political change from above. Stasis and dogmatism were seen as recipes for stagnation and collapse.
What we are witnessing as the party turns 90, however, is the opposite. Instead of being secure and confident, it is seemingly frozen in fear of the future, unsure about its grip over ethnic regions (Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia), afraid of rising social unrest and ad hoc demonstrations, worried about the macro-economy and foreign relations, and on the cusp of a major leadership transition in 2012.
Moreover, a coalition of internal security forces, giant state-owned corporations, the propaganda apparatus, and the military have joined with hard-line elements in the party to pull back from reforms.
Yet there is a reformist wing in the party, led by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, which advocates more open politics. But it does not have the resources or allies to re-ignite political reforms. The intra-party cleavage runs high and deep and party members here indicate viewpoints and factions are becoming increasingly polarized. The pending leadership transition only adds to the risk aversion and crackdown.
China’s Communist Party at 90 is a bit like many 90-year-olds: increasingly infirm, fearful, experimenting with ways to prolong life, but overwhelmed by the complexities of managing it.
David Shambaugh is professor and director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University and the author of “China’s Communist Party: Atrophy & Adaptation.”
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