《金融时报》：美国将打赢全球汇率战

美国将打赢全球汇率战　　

英国《金融时报》 马丁·沃尔夫　　

二零一零年十月十四日　　

国际货币基金组织(IMF)今年年会上的主题是货币。更确切地说，是两种货币：美元和人民币。前者是因为被认为太疲软；后者是因为被认为太僵化。然而，在这些争论的背后有一个巨大的挑战：如何最好地管理全球经济调整？　　

在最新一期《世界经济展望》(World Economic Outlook)的序言中，IMF经济学家奥利维尔·布兰查德(Olivier Blanchard)指出：“实现‘强劲、均衡、持续’的全球复苏--援引G20在匹兹堡确定的目标--从来都不是易事……它要求进行两项根本性的、困难重重的经济再平衡活动。”　　

    一是内部再平衡：发达国家恢复对私人需求的依赖；削减金融危机中形成的财政赤字。二是外部再平衡：美国及其它一些发达国家加大对净出口的依赖；一些新兴国家（特别是中国）加大对内需的依赖。遗憾的是，布兰查德教授的结论是：“目前这两项再平衡活动的进展过于缓慢。”　　

    我们可以从两个层面来探讨经济再平衡活动。第一，以前高消费、高赤字的发达国家，在通往太平洋投资管理公司(Pimco)的穆罕默德·埃尔--埃利安(Mohamed El-Erian)所称的“新常态”的路上，必须让私人部门“去杠杆化”。第二，国际收支状况强劲和--或蕴含大好投资机遇的经济体，需要让实际汇率升值，而由此导致的净出口对经济的拖累，则需通过扩大内需加以抵消。　　

    发行储备货币的发达国家（特别是美国）所采取的激进货币政策，在这两个过程中都是一个元素。随着市场推动各种货币对美元走高，痛苦的呼号如今响彻世界各地。这在一定程度上反映美国政策造成的影响不均，更反映资本流入国绝不甘愿接受必要的变化，而正试图把不受欢迎的调整转移到别国头上。说白了，美国希望让世界其它地区出现通胀，而后者希望让美国陷入通缩。美国必赢无疑，因为它拥有无止境的“弹药”：美联储可以不受限制地“创造”美元。需要讨论的是世界投降的条件：即各国在名义汇率和国内政策上所需的调整。　　

    如果你想知道美国的政策有可能达到多激进的程度，可以听一听纽约联储主席威廉·达德利(William Dudley)近期的一番讲话。他说：“近几个季度的经济增长步伐一直令人失望，即使年初时我们的预期并不高。”尤其是这背后隐藏着美国家庭的去杠杆化。那么货币政策对此能够发挥什么作用呢？他的答案是，“极低的利率可对资产估值起到支撑作用，包括使房价变得更可承受，并减少部分贷款者需支付的利息，从而有助于使调整过程变得平稳。除此之外……就货币政策能够割断潜在负面经济后果分布的‘尾巴’而言……极低利率有助于鼓励有余钱的家庭和企业花掉这些钱，从而达到上述目的。”　　

    最重要的是，当前处于低位、且不断下滑的通胀率有可能造成灾难性后果。在最糟糕的情况下，经济可能陷入债务通缩的局面。目前，美国的收益率和通胀率已经踏上了日本在上世纪九十年代的老路。美联储希望阻止这一趋势。这就是新一轮量化宽松货币政策似乎即将启动的原因所在。简言之，为了避免通缩，美国的政策制定者将采取一切必要手段。的确，美联储将坚决保持宽松政策，直至美国令人满意地实现通货再膨胀。此举对世界其它地区有何影响，则不在其考虑之中。　　

这种政策会对全球造成明显影响，包括带动长期资产价格上涨，并鼓励资本流入货币政策扩张性较弱的国家（如瑞士）或回报率较高的国家（如新兴经济体）。眼下正是这种局面。华盛顿的国际金融研究所(Institute for International Finance)预测，二零一零和二零一一年期间，新兴经济体的资本净流入将超过八千亿美元，这些资本的流入国将大举进行干预，只是力度会日趋减弱。　　

资本流入国（不管是发达国家还是新兴国家）将面临不愉快的选择：或者让汇率升值，从而削弱外部竞争力；或者干预汇市，从而蓄积不想要的美元，既影响国内货币稳定，也有损外部竞争力；或者采取税收和管制手段，限制资本流入。历史上各国政府会综合采用这三种手段。这次也将一如既往。　　

自然，人们可能会设想一种相反的做法。事实上，中国反对美国的巨额财赤和非常规货币政策。中国也决心压低国内通胀，并抑制人民币升值。这一政策表达出一种清晰的含意：实际汇率的调整，应该经由美国国内物价的下跌来实现。中国想迫使美国进行通缩调整，就像德国目前对希腊所做的那样。可这种情况是不可能发生的--即使发生也不符合中国利益。作为债权国，如果美国所欠债务的实际价值出现增长，中国将坐收增值之利。但一旦美国陷入通缩，世界就有严重衰退之虞。　　

布兰查德说的无疑很到位：今后的调整将十分艰巨，而且这一过程几乎还没有开始。在汇率和外部账户调整方面，美国非但没有寻求合作，反而试图通过印钞，把自己的意志强加于人。美国无论如何都将赢得这场战争--不是让世界其它地区陷入通胀，就是迫使它们的名义汇率对美元升值。遗憾的是，其影响也将是芜杂不一的：防护手段较少的经济体（如巴西或南非）将被迫调整；有外汇管制作屏障的经济体（如中国），将能够更好地适应调整。　　

假如各方寻求达成合作的局面，情况将会好得多。或许G二十领导人甚至能够利用他们的“相互评估程序”实现合作。十一月份的首尔峰会就是机会。这事从必要性来说是毋庸置疑的，但从各方的意愿来说却有很多疑问。在危机最严重时期，各国领导人团结一致，而如今美联储即将对他们各个击破。　　

英文原文：　　

Why America is going to win the global currency battle　　

By Martin Wolf　　

Published: October 12 2010　　

Currencies dominated this year’s annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund. More precisely, two currencies did: the dollar and the renminbi, the former because it was deemed too weak and the latter because it was deemed too inflexible. But, behind the squabbles, lies a huge challenge: how best to manage the global economic adjustment.　　

In his foreword to the new World Economic Outlook, Olivier Blanchard, the IMF’s economic counsellor, states: “Achieving a ‘strong, balanced and sustained world recovery’ – to quote from the goal set in Pittsburgh by the G20 – was never going to be easy ... It requires two fundamental and difficult economic rebalancing acts.”　　

The first is internal rebalancing – a return to reliance on private demand in advanced countries and retrenchment of the fiscal deficits that opened in the crisis. The second is external rebalancing – greater reliance on net exports by the US and some other advanced countries and on domestic demand by some emerging countries, notably China. Unfortunately, concludes, Professor Blanchard, “these two rebalancing acts are taking place too slowly”.　　

We can consider this rebalancing on two dimensions. First, the erstwhile high-spending, high-deficit advanced countries need to de-leverage their private sectors on the journey to what Mohamed El-Erian of Pimco, the investment company, called “the new normal”, in his Per Jacobsson lecture. Second, the real exchange rates of economies with robust external positions, strong investment opportunities, or both, need to appreciate, while expansion of domestic demand offsets the consequent drag from net exports. 　　

Aggressive monetary policy by reserve-issuing advanced countries, particularly the US, is an element in both processes. The cries of pain now heard around the world, as markets push currencies up against the dollar, partly reflect the uneven impact of US policy. Still more, they reflect the stubborn unwillingness to accept the needed changes, with each capital recipient trying to deflect the unwanted adjustment elsewhere. 　　

To put it crudely, the US wants to inflate the rest of the world, while the latter is trying to deflate the US. The US must win, since it has infinite ammunition: there is no limit to the dollars the Federal Reserve can create. What needs to be discussed is the terms of the world’s surrender: the needed changes in nominal exchange rates and domestic policies around the world.　　

If you wish to understand how aggressive US policy might become, read a recent speech by William Dudley, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He notes that “in recent quarters the pace of growth has been disappointing even relative to our modest expectations at the start of the year”. Behind this lies deleveraging by US households, in particular. So what can monetary policy do about it? His answer is that “very low interest rates can help smooth the adjustment process by supporting asset valuations, including making housing more affordable and by allowing some borrowers to reduce debt interest payments. Beyond this ... to the extent that monetary policy can ‘cut off the tail’ of the distribution of potential adverse economic outcomes ... it can help encourage those households and businesses with money to spend to do so”.　　

Above all, today’s low and falling inflation is potentially calamitous. At worst, the economy might succumb to debt-deflation. US yields and inflation are already following the path of Japan’s in the 1990s (see chart). The Fed wants to stop this trend. That is why another round of quantitative easing seems imminent.　　

In short, US policymakers will do whatever is required to avoid deflation. Indeed, the Fed will keep going until the US is satisfactorily reflated. What that effort does to the rest of the world is not its concern.　　

The global consequences are evident: the policy will raise prices of long-term assets and encourage capital to flow into countries with less expansionary monetary policies (such as Switzerland) or higher returns (such as emerging economies). This is what is happening. The Washington-based Institute for International Finance forecasts net inflows of capital from abroad into emerging economies of more than $800bn in 2010 and 2011. It also forecasts massive intervention by recipients of this capital, albeit at a falling rate (see chart).　　

Recipients of the capital inflow, be they advanced or emerging countries, face uncomfortable choices: let the exchange rate appreciate, so impairing external competitiveness; intervene in currency markets, so accumulating unwanted dollars, threatening domestic monetary stability and impairing external competitiveness; or curb the capital inflow, via taxes and controls. Historically, governments have chosen combinations of all three. That will be the case this time, too.　　

Naturally, one could imagine an opposite course. Indeed, China objects to the huge US fiscal deficits and unconventional monetary policies. China is also determined to keep inflation down at home and limit the appreciation of its currency. The implication of this policy is clear: adjustments in real exchange rates should occur via falling US domestic prices. China wants to impose a deflationary adjustment on the US, just as Germany is doing to Greece. This is not going to happen. Nor would it be in China’s interest if it did. As a creditor, it would enjoy an increase in the real value of its claims on the US. But US deflation would threaten a world slump.　　

Prof Blanchard is clearly right: the adjustments ahead are going to be very difficult; and they have also hardly begun. Instead of co-operation on adjustment of exchange rates and the external account, the US is seeking to impose its will, via the printing press. The US is going to win this war, one way or the other: it will either inflate the rest of the world or force their nominal exchange rates up against the dollar. Unfortunately, the impact will also be higgledy piggledy, with the less protected economies (such as Brazil or South Africa) forced to adjust and others, protected by exchange controls (such as China), able to manage the adjustment better.　　

It would be far better for everybody to seek a co-operative outcome. Maybe the leaders of the group of 20 will even be able to use their “mutual assessment process” to achieve just that. Their November summit in Seoul is the opportunity. Of the need there can be no doubt. Of the will, the doubts are many. In the worst of the crisis, leaders hung together. Now, the Fed is about to hang them all separately.　　

（[email protected]，2010-10 ）　　

×  WYZXWK.COM

您的打赏将用于网站日常运行与维护。
帮助我们办好网站，宣传红色文化！

欢迎扫描下方二维码，订阅网刊微信公众号